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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH

\V ALTER LARSON, ALEIDA P.

LARSON and JON LARSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case
No. 9365

-vs.-

ROBERT GEORGE EVANS, M.D.,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APP'ELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages against the defendant for personal injuries and
property damage growing out of an automobile accident
at the intersection of Evergreen Avenue and 23rd East
Street on the evening of October 23, 1958, at approximately 8 :50 p.m.
Plaintiffs appeal to this court from a jury verdict of
no cause of action based upon its finding that plaintiff
1
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Jon Larson, the driver of the automobile in which the
plaintiffs were riding, was contributorily negligent, and
that such contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident and plaintiffs' injuries. The lower
court also held that the negligence of Jon Larson was
imputed to the other plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The undisputed facts in this case, as determined by
the lower court and set forth in the pretrial order (R. 1417), establish that the accident complained of occurred
at the intersection of Evergreen Avenue and 23rd East
Street in Salt Lake County on October 23,1958, at approximately 8:50p.m., and that traffic entering said intersection from Evergreen A venue was controlled by a stop
sign at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs were proceeding north on 23rd East Street in an automobile driven
by Jon Larson, one of the plaintiffs. The defendant was
driving west on Evergreen A venue.
The testimony in the case was not contdictory and,
even viewing it in the most favorable light for the defendant, consisted of the undisputed facts hereinafter set
forth. The defendant testified that he was proceeding
at 30 miles per hour or less and that he did not see the
stop sign controlling his entrance to 23rd East Street
and that he did not stop, or attempt to stop, in obedience
to the stop sign. (R. 116, 117, 120, 124, 404). He even
admitted that he considered the accident to he his own
fault at the trial below (R. 124, 404) in addition to
2
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making such admission to others at the scene of the accident. (R. 136, 174). The defendant testified that his speed
at the time of impact was 20 miles per hour. (R. 119).
Based upon the a hove admissions the court instructed the
jury that the defendant was negligent as a matter of
law. (R. 68).
With respect to the physical nature of the intersection as it existed at the time of the accident the evidence
clearly indicated that a dense five or six-foot hedge and
house obscured from the vision of the plaintiffs all westbound traffic approaching 23rd East on Evergreen
A venue. The existence of such hedge, as shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit P-1 to extend along the south side of Evergreen Avenue to within a few feet of the edge of 23rd
East, was confirmed by the defendant (R. 121), Deputy
Sheriff Clifford J. Gunn (R. 127, 422), Clifford A. Coon
(R. 136-137), Jon Larson (R. 175), and Alice Taggart
(R. 366-367). The defendant admitted that the hedge
obscured his vision of the northbound Larson vehicle on
23rd East. (R. 121). Deputy Sheriff Clifford J. Gunn
testified that one could not see through the hedge because
of its density on the night of the accident. (R. 422).
The width of Evergreen Avenue was established at
24 feet by Deputy Sheriff Gunn (R. 416) and plaintiff
Jon Larson (R. 411). The right front of the Larson
vehicle collided with the left front of the defendant's
automobile at a point 21 feet 5 inches north from the
projected south boundary of Evergreen A venue as each
driver swerved to avoid the collision after which both
3
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vehicles came to rest facing north in the west or southbound traffic lane of 23rd East Street. (Exhibits P-1, P-4).
Deputy Sheriff Gunn testified that the Larson vehicle laid
down 40 feet of skid marks prior to the point of impact
(R. 128, 417) and that these skid marks commenced 13
feet 8 inches south of the obstructing hedge on Evergreen Avenue. (R. 420). Deputy Sheriff Gunn also testified
that the skid marks indicated the speed of the Larson
vehicle to be 30 miles per hour and, therefore, the normal
reaction distance would be 33 feet from the time the driver
was alerted to danger to the point at which the skid marks
commenced, resulting in a total distance of 73 feet from
the moment the driver of the Larson vehicle was alerted
to his peril to the actual point of impact. (R. 419-420). The
Deputy Sheriff also stated that there were no skid marks
left by defendant's automobile (R. 130, 417) and that
there were no skid marks after the point of impact.
(R. 416).
Jon Larson testified that he was proceeding north
on 23rd East Street at approximately 25 miles per hour
which was corroborated by Mrs. Larson. (R. 171, 173, 197,
229). He testified on direct examination that he applied
his brakes the instant that he saw the defendant's car
and that the car he was driving and the defendant's car
entered the intersection at about the same time. (R. 171).
When asked what attracted his attention to the defendant's automobile he stated that the first thing he saw
were headlights which he could see for about 2 seconds,
and that it appeared that the other car ''was coming quite
fast." (R. 173). With respect to the location of defend4
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ant's automobile when he first saw it, Jon stated that it
would have been the point at which the defendant's car
first became visible to him. (R. 172). On cross-examination he testified that, to the best of his knowledge, the
rectangles designated as "E-1" and "L-1" on Exhibit
"P-1" represented the location of the defendant's automobile as well as the one he was driving at the moment
he first saw the defendant's automobile. (R. 197-198).
He also stated that he did not actually recall applying his
brakes although he must have done so as shown by the
testimony of Deputy Sheriff Gunn. (R. 199). With respect
to one's faculty for memory under the circumstances of
this accident, Dr. Paul Milligan, who was called as a witness for the defendant, testified that the combined factors
of an accident resulting in a broken leg to a loved one
could produce a state of shock to one who had suffered
neck injuries in the same accident, and that such a state
of shock could result in mental confusion and a failure to
remember clearly the events precipitating the condition.
(R. 399).
The defendant himself testified that, because of the
hedge on the south side of Evergreen A venue, he did not
see the Larson vehicle until it was toward the front of
him and that he wasn't aware of any danger until he had
reached a point in the vicinity of the stop sign on Evergreen Avenue as shown on Exhibit "P-1." (R. 121, 118).
Alice Taggart, a passenger in the defendant's automobile, testified that both cars were in the intersection when
she first noticed danger. (R. 365).
5
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The court submitted interrogatories to the jurors for
their determination as to whether Jon Larson was negligent in the operation of the Larson automobile in that
he (a) failed to keep a proper lookout, (b) did not have
his car under control, or (c) was driving too fast for existing conditions. The jurors answered "yes" to said interrogatory and found that the negligence of Jon Larson was
the proximate cause of the accident and plaintiffs' injuries. (R. 82-83).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN SUB~HTTING THE QUESTION OF JON LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE
JURY.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN PAGES
27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL
AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE 430 OF THE
RECORD ON APPEAL.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.

6
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 3 FOR THE REASON THAT IT
WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF JON LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE
JURY.
It is a basic hornbook law that there must be substantial evidence of negligence to sustain a verdict of negligence. It is also elementary that evidence which makes
the question of negligence a matter of mere surmise, conjecture, or speculation, or which gives rise merely to a
possibility of negligence, does not justify submission of
the case to the jury. See 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, §332,
P. 1031; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, §1178; 65 C. J. 8., N egligence, §253, P. 1141. Furthermore, a case should not be
left to the jury if the evidence is as consistent with the

7
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absence of negligence as with its existence. See 65 C. J. S.,
supra., footnote 57, for authorities so holding.
The lower court submitted the following interrogatory to the jury in instruction No. 17, which was answered
affirmatively by the jury:
'' 2. Was the plaintiff, Jon Larson, negligent in
the operation of the Larson automobile at the
time of the accident in one or more of the following contentions~
(a) That he failed to keep a proper lookout
for traffic entering 23rd East and Evergreen A venue.
(b) That he did not have his car under
control.
(c) That he was driving too fast for existing
conditions.''
An examination of the record in this case fails to disclose any evidence whatsoever upon which the court was
justified in submitting the above interrogatory, or any
part thereof, to the jury. Let us consider the first contention relating to the failure of Jon Larson to maintain a
proper lookout. The only evidence upon which such a
finding could he based was the testimony of Jon Larson
that, to the best of his recollection, his automobile, as
well as the defendant's automobile, had entered the intersection when he first saw the defendant's automobile.
This testimony, however, is clearly shown to be subject to
the frailty of memory and contrary to the physical evidence (with justification) under the circumstances and
trauma of this accident as they affected Mr. Larson. The
8
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defendant's O\\·n witness, Dr. Milligan, testified that the
combined factors of the accident, together with the injuries suffered by the driver and his knowledge of serious
injuries to loved ones, such as that suffered by his mother
in the accident, could produce a state of shock resulting
in mental confusion and a failure to clearly remember
the events precipitating the accident. That this is so is
graphically illustrated by the fact that Mr. Larson also
testified that he did not actually recall applying his
brakes, although it was not disputed, and the evidence is
conclusive, that the automobile he was driving laid down
40 feet of skid marks prior to the point of impact. This
latter fact was established without contradiction through
the testimony of the deputy sheriff who investigated the
accident. The same investigating officer presented undisputed evidence that such skid marks, together with reaction time, established that the driver of the Larson vehicle
had actually reacted to his visual observations of apparent danger at a point 46 feet 8 inches south of the hedge
which was located on the south side of Evergreen Avenue
at its intersection with 23rd East Street. Under these
circumstances the lower court should have resolved the
testimony consistent with the physical facts and the other
testimony of the witness. Indeed, this court has held
that in weighing the testimony of an individual witness,
consideration should not be restricted to isolated portions
thereof, but all of the witness' testimony, including that
given on direct and on cross-examination, should be considered as whole . .Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P.
2d 986, citing Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80 U.
187, 14 P. 2d 973, 981. On cross-examination Jon Larson
9
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stated that the skid marks were caused by his car.
(R. 199). On direct examination he stated that he saw
the defendant's vehicle at the very moment that it could
have become visible to him (R. 172), and that he recalled
seeing headlights for approximately 2 seconds. (R. 173).
In view of the above physical evidence it is the plaintiffs' contention that the testimony of Jon Larson, upon
which the interrogatory relating to proper lookout was
submitted, could not be given such probative value by the
lower court as to sustain the verdict of the jury as a matter of law. It is the general rule, and the rule in this
state, that testimony which is contrary to uncontroverted
physical facts, does not constitute substantial evidence.
Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 U. 552, 262
P. 101; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, §1183; 32 C.J.S., Evidence,
§1031(c).
The undisputed physical evidence indicates that Mr.
Larson, who had the right of way, observed some threat
to his continued course of travel northward on 23rd East
at a point some 46 feet south of the hedge bordering
Evergreen and that he reacted in the normal manner by
immediately applying his brakes. These facts indicate a
remarkable sense of awareness and defensive care on the
part of ~1r. Larson. Especially is this so in view of the
existence of the 5 or 6-foot hedge and house that obstructed his view of Evergreen A venue entirely. Even
the defendant testified that the density of the bushes on
the south side of Evergreen was such that he was not
aware of any danger and did not see the Larson vehicle
10
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until both vehicles ha.d entered the intersection. (R. 118(121). The defendant's passenger, Alice Taggart, also
testified that both cars were in the intersection before she
sensed danger which she attributed partly to the existence of the aforementioned shrubbery. (R. 365-366). Certainly, if the defendant's view southward was obliterated
by the hedge, Mr. Larson's northward view of Evergreen
Avenue was likewise blocked. Under such uncontroverted
circumstances Mr. Larson's statement that he did not see
the defendant's car until both had entered the intersection is undoubtedly true as being the only physical possibility under the circumstances. HOWEVER, the
aforementioned physical facts of a previous awareness
of danger are even greater testimony of the extreme
standard of care actually exercised by Mr. Larson, and
his frankness in asserting facts from impaired memory
which do not entirely comport with the undisputed
physical evidence should not, under any circumstances,
serve as the executioner to his cause of action, as well
as that of the other plaintiffs, on the gangplank of contributory negligence. Certainly such statements could
not, and should not, be held to establish a '' preponderance" of the evidence. See Stickle v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 122 U. 477, 251 P. 2d 867, and Ray v. Consolidated
Freightways, 4 U 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196.
This court has held that contributory negligence is
a question of law where the evidence shows, with such
certainty that reasonable minds could not differ thereon,
that the conduct in question either met or failed to meet
the standard of due care. Cooper v. Eva;ns, 1 U. 2d 68,
11
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262 P. 2d 278; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, §255. And, notwithstanding that contributory negligence is ordinarily a
question of fact, where undisputed facts lead reasonable
minds to one conclusion, the court must declare such
conclusion as a matter of law. Maybee v. Maybee, 79 U.
585, 11 P. 2d 973. This court has also held that (1) an
instruction must be based on evidence ; ( 2) it is prejudicial error to submit a charged act of negligence to a
jury for its consideration in the absence of evidence tending to support a finding that the act occurred; (3) a
court may not permit a jury to speculate on evidence; and
( 4) a finding of fact cannot be based on surmise, conjecture, guess, or speculation. Olsen v. W arwood, 123 U.
111, 255 P. 2d 725, and cases therein cited. To allow the
jury to consider the question of whether or not Jon
Larson maintained a proper lookout for traffic entering
23rd East on Evergreen A venue under the undisputed
physical facts and evidence in this case does violence
to every rule above set forth. Such a, ruling would result
1n the realization of a practice clearly denounced by
Judge Wolfe in the case of Paulyv. McCarthy, 109 U. 398,
166 P. 2d 501, 513-514, where he cited Lord Cairns in
Metropolitan Ra.ilway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cases 193,
197, 47 L. J. C. P. 303, as follows:
''The judge has a certain duty to discharge, and
the jurors have another and a different duty. The
judge has to say whether any facts have been
established by evidence from which negligence
may be reasonably inferred, the jurors have to say
whether, from those facts, when submitted to them,
negligence ought to be inferred. It is, my opinion,
of the greatest importance in the administration
12
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of justice that these separate functions should be
maintained, and should be maintained distinct. It
would be a serious inroad on the province of a
jury, if, in a case where there are facts from which
negligence may reasonably be inferred, the judge
were to withdraw the case from the jury upon the
ground that, in his opinion, negligence ought not
to be inferred; arnd it would, on the other hand,
place in the ha~nds of the jurors a power which
might be exercised in the most a,rbitrary marnn,er,
'if they were at liberty to hold that negligence
might be inferred from any state of facts whatever." (Latter emphasis added.)
It necessarily follows from the above, as a matter of
law, that the lower court erred in submitting the question
of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury on the
basis of improper lookout for the following reasons: (1)
there was no evidence whatsoever upon which to base
such a finding, (2) there was no substantial evidence
upon which to base such a finding, (3) there was no preponderance of evidence upon which to base such a finding, ( 4) reasonable minds could not differ upon the evidence in this case as to the exercise of due care by Jon
Larson, ( 5) it clearly allowed the jury to speculate on the
evidence, (6) it allowed the jury to base a finding of fact
on surmise, conjecture, guess, or speculation, (7) the
only evidence upon which such a finding could have been
found was as consistent, and even more consistent, with
the absence of negligence than with its existence, and (8)
it left to the province of the jury the power to ''hold
that negligence might be inferred from any state of facts
·whatever.'' For the reasons the verdict and judgments
are improper as a matter of law.

13
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It might we well to here point out that the trial
judge, in a memorandum opinion denying the plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial, assumed that the evidence indicated, and that the plaintiff driver had admitted, that
he could see the lights of the defendant's car through
the thick, high hedge, and that the jury, therefore, might
believe that Jon Larson, after seeing the car lights
through the hedge, ''gave no further thought to what
was happening on his right, until the instant before the
collision." (R. 102). Such an assumption as to the evidence is absolutely incorrect and has no basis in the record of this case whatsoever. The evidence was conclusive
that, on the night of the accident, auto lights could not
be seen through the hedge from the point where the
Larson vehicle commenced laying down skid marks. Furthermore, the possible jury conclusion which the trial
judge indulged from the assumed facts is absolutely
contrary to, and refuted by, the physical evidence of continued skid marks to the joint of impact. The trial court's
declaration would allow the most flagrant type of speculation by the jury upon the evidence.
The trial court in its memorandum decision also recognized the holding in Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U. 2d 435, 326
P. 2d 722, and cited Justice Crockett's concurring opinion therein to the effect that '' ( t )he verdict, when supported by substantial evidence should be regarded as
presumptively correct and should not be interfered with
merely because the judge might disagree with the result.''
(Emphasis added). It is the plaintiff's contention that,
in view of the authority of H aarstrich v. Oregon Short
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lfin.e

R. Co., supra, which holds that testimony contrary

to undisputed physical facts does not constitute substantial evidence, the lower court applied the doctrine of
Holmes incorrectly in this case.
Secondly, the court instructed the jury to consider
the question of whether Jon Larson had his car under
control in determining the existence of contributory negligence. There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record
that would warrant that portion of the instruction. The
undisputed physical evidence, as set forth hereinabove,
indicated the plaintiff driver's awareness and prudent
reaction to the circumstances confronting him. Even the
defendant admitted that the plaintiff driver attempted to
avoid the accident (R. 116) thereby implying the latter's
control over the vehicle while he was driving. Insofar as
the evidence of the speed of the Larson car is related to
the control exercised by the driver over the vehicle, the
subject shall be hereafter explored in the next succeeding paragraphs.
Lastly, the jury was charged with the responsibility
of determining whether the plaintiff driver was driving
too fast for existing conditions as an element of contributory negligence. The lower court placed considera hie
emphasis upon the combination of skid marks, the force
of the collision and the distance plaintiff's car traveled
after impact as evidence for the jury to evaluate upon
the question of speed. (R. 103). The fatal error of the
court in this regard is the total absence in the record of
any evidence of the prevailing speed limit or the reason-
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able speed under the conditions then prevailing upon
23rd East Street. The weather was clear, the roads dry,
and there was no traffic on 23rd East approaching from
the north. ( R. 405). The only evidence in the record of
the speed of the Larson automobile prior to the accident
is Jon Larson's testimony, corroborated by that of his
mother, that he was traveling 25 miles per hour and the
testimony of Deputy Sheriff Gunn that the skid marks
revealed a speed of 30 miles per hour for the Larson auto.
It was undisputed that the speed of the defendant's automobile was at least 20 miles per hour at the time of the
impact (R. 119) which would account for considerable
force in the actual collision and would likewise add a forward movement to the plaintiffs' automobile following
impact by reason of the ultimate common direction of
both vehicles and the free-wheeling of the vehicles resulting from the release of brakes caused by the impact itself
as evidenced by the lack of skid marks following the point
of impact. Certainly, the damage to the vehicles and
their location following the point of impact is as consistent with the absence of negligence on the plaintiff
driver's part as with its existence. See 6'5 C.J.S., N egligence, §253, footnote 57. BUT, even assuming that such
evidence is sufficient to indicate additional speed of the
Larson vehicle, there is no evidence to indicate the amount
of any such additional speed and no evidentiary guide
whatsoever for the jury to follow in determining what
speed was reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and with regard to the actual and poteintia.l hazards then
existing as required by Section 41-6-46, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended.
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The pnma facie speed limit on 23rd East Street
south of Evergreen A venue could be as high as 50 miles
per hour so far as the evidence in this case is concerned
and bearing in mind that this accident occurred at night.
[t is submitted that perhaps this court will take judicial
notice of the ordinances of Salt Lake County which established the prima facie speed limit upon this street at 35
miles per hour on the night in question. In any event, it
is clear that the jury had no sufficient evidence upon which
to make a determination as to the excessiveness or unreasonableness of the speed of the Larson vehicle and it was
the defendant's duty to provide the evidence upon which
such a :finding could be made by the jury. The jury was
thus allowed by the lower court to resort to the most
flagrant speculation, conjecture and guessing in arriving
at the standard of a reasonable speed to apply to the operation of the plaintiffs' automobile on the night in question.
The following statement of Justice Pratt in his dissent in Horsley v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 P. 2d 592, is
most appropriate:
''To hand the jury various speeds and various
distances and ask them to select which is reasonable and which is unreasonable without giving
them an evidentiary standard upon which to base
their selection, is to ask them to speculate. In the
majority of the cases, it will result in their reasoning backward from the resultant accident that
the speed at which they conclude the driver was
going must have been unreasonable or else the
accident would not have happened. Such reasoning by its very nature assumes the proximate
cause element; * * * ''
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Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a motor
vehicle within the speed limit prescribed by statute or
ordinance except under special circumstances such as
fog limiting visibility or ice and snow upon the road. See
Lochhead v. Jensen, 42 U. 99, 129 P. 347; Shields v.
Ramon., 122 U. 474, 251 P. 2d 671; Horsley v. Robinson,
Supra; H un.ter v. Michaelis, 114 U. 242, 198 P. 2d 245;
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. There can
be no question that special circumstances, such as fog,
ice or snow did not exist on the night of the subject accident so as to limit the general rule above stated. However, the evidentiary yardstick, i. e., the prima facie
speed limit, was unavailable to the jury in their deliberations upon the evidence in this case. It necessarily follows that the jury could do nothing but speculate as to
what would constitute an excessive or unreasonable
speed for the Larson auto under the conditions then
prevailing. Such a result is clearly proscribed in Olsen v.

W arwood, supra. The rule was succinctly stated in Alvarado v. Tucker, supra, as follows at page 988 of 268

P. 2d:
''The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could
not be based on mere speculation or conjecture,
but only on a preponderance of the evidence. This
means the greater weight of the evidence, or as
sometimes stated, such degree of proof that the
greater probability of truth lies therein. A choice
of probabilities does not meet this requirement.
It crea.tes only a basis for conjecture, on which a
verdict of the jury canrnot starnd." (Emphasis
added).
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The only standard of a speed limit that could be applied under the evidence in this case would be that set
forth under the statute, namely 50 miles per hour. And
it is certain beyond any doubt that the evidence in this
case would not warrant a finding of the plaintiffs' speed
in exceess of that speed limit. Indeed, the evidence would
not sustain a finding of plaintiffs' speed in excess of 30
miles per hour, and most certainly not in excess of 35
miles per hour. Therefore, it was error for the lower
court to submit the question of the plaintiffs' speed to the
jury for their determination with respect to the contributory negligence of Jon Larson.

It follows from the above that each and every contention relating to the possible contributory negligence
of the plaintiff Jon Larson was not sustained, as a matter
of law, by the evidence and, therefore, the court erred in
submitting the special interrogatories contained in Instruction No. 17 to the jury. It likewise must be concluded that the verdict and judgment rendered thereon
are not sustained by the evidence as a matter of law.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN PAGES
27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL
AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE 430 OF THE
RECORD ON APPEAL.
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Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth
under Point I and for the reasons therein set forth urge
this court to set aside the verdict and judgment of the
lower court and order said court to grant the plaintiffs a
new trial solely for the purpose of ascertaining the
amount of damages suffered by each individual plaintiff
and that the lower court enter judgment for plaintiffs in
accordance with such findings.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set
forth under POINTS I, IV and V.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 3 FOR THE REASON THAT IT
WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Instruction No. 3 given by the lower court commenced by charging the jury that the defendant was
negligent as a matter of law. In the very next paragraph
therein the court proceeds to instruct the jury upon the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff Jon Larson and
the effect of the same upon the remaining plaintiffs.
(R. 68). It is too clear for argument that each instruction related to matter totally disconnected from the other.
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In fact one part of the instruction related to the theory
of the plaintiff on one distinct question and the other
portion related to the theory of the defendant upon a
completely separate question. The net result would very
likely result in confusion to the jury and, in this particular case, could have resulted in the application of the
plaintiffs' theory of the case, i.e., negligence as a matter
of law, to the conduct of the plaintiff Jon Larson by the
jury. And, although this court has held that the respective
theories of both parties upon a single proposition, may
be embodied in a single instruction, Toon.e v. J. P. 0 'Neill
Construction. Co., 40 U. 265, 121 P. 10, it has never espoused a rule which would allow the theories of the parties upon unrela.ted propositions to be included within
the same instruction. Quite to the contrary this court
has held that a judge may not give an instruction which
will tend to confuse the jury in the consideration of the
issues in the case. Riding v. Roylance, 63 U. 221,224 P.
885. As to misleading and confusing instructions generally see 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §555. Furthermore, it is
generally held that it is good practice to embody each
separate proposition of law in a single instruction and
that the blending of separate and distinct legal propositions in the same instruction is bad form. Rocky MountainMotor Co. v. Walker, 71 Colo. 53,203 P. 1095; H. & S.
Theatres Co. v. Hamp·ton, 300 Ky. 677, 190 S. W. 2d 39.
In view of the inherent confusion in the named
instruction as to the respective liabilities of the parties
under separate propositions of law and its very possible
prejudicial effect upon the jury's consideration of the
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plaintiffs' case, it is submitted that this court should
reverse the ruling of the lower court upon this point and
grant the plaintiffs a new trial even if this court should
disagree with the appellants on Point I.

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY.
Instruction No. 8 reads as follows :
''The party upon whom the burden of proof
rests must sustain it by a preponderance of the
evidence. The law does not permit you to base a
verdict on speculation or conjecture as to the
cause of the collision in question. If the evidence
does not preponderate in favor of the party making the charge of negligence, then that party has
failed to fulfill his burden of proofand your finding must be against the party on that issue. In
other words, if after considering all of the evidence, it should appear to you just as probable
that the party charged with negligence was not
negligent or that he was, or that his negligence,
if any, was not a proximate cause of the collision,
or that it was such a proximate cause, then a case
has not been established against him by a preponderance of the evidence as the law requires."
(Emphasis added)
In a previous instruction the court had directed that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Without
limiting the application of the above instruction to the
claimed contributory negligence of plaintiff Jon Larson,
the jury was free to reconsider the existence of negligence on the part of the defendant and was, in fact, invited to do so. When the court had determined that the
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defendant was negligent as a matter of law it clearly was
error thereafter to instruct the jury on negligence and
whether or not they should determine its existence without limiting its application to the only remaining party
charged with acts of negligence. Under this instruction
the jury could conclude that it must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was in fact
negligent. This is manifestly inconsistent with the prior
instruction and, therefore, is sufficient ground for reversal. State v. W aid, 92 U. 297, 67 P. 2d 647; Konold v.
Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 U. 379, 60 P. 1021, 81 Am. St.
Rep. 693. In the latter case the court stated the rule as
follows at page 1025 of 60 P. Reporter :
"Instructions on a material point in the case
which are inconsistent or contradictory should not
be given. The giving of such instructions is error,
and a sufficient ground of reversal, because it is
impossible, after verdict, to ascertain which instruction the jury followed, or what influence the
erroneous instruction had in their deliberation.
This has been so uniformly held that citations are
unnecessary.''
See also Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 U. 366, 270 P. 349.
This court, in the W aid case cited the rule set forth in
65 C. J. 671, §600, as follows:
''It is proper to refuse, and error to give conflicting and contradictory instructions, since a
charge containing two distinct propositions conflicting with each other tends so to confuse the
jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent verdict, the jury cannot be required to determine what part of a contradictory charge is correct, or left to reconcile conflicting principles of
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law; it ordinarily cannot be determined from the
verdict which rule was adapted by the jury, the
court is left in doubt and uncertainty as to the
facts actually found by the jury as a basis for its
verdict, and where instructions are inconsistent
with, or contradict, each other, it is usually impossible to say whether the jury were controlled by
the one or the other.''
See also 88 C.J.S., Trial, §339.
The case of Morrison v. Perry, 104 U. 151, 140 P. 2d
772, is not only in point on the law, but also on the facts.
In that case it was held that instructions that if a person
drove an automobile in a certain manner he was negligent, and that if he drove in that manner the jury was
to determine whether or not he was negligent, were
conflicting and erroneous in that the instructions permitted the jury to decide that acts negligent as a matter
of law were not negligent. The giving of such instructions
was held to constitute error in that case.
Upon the above authority it would appear unrefutable that the giving of Instruction No. 8 by the lower
court was reversible error.

CONCLUSION
In view of the undisputed evidence in this case, the
duty imposed upon the plaintiff driver by the lower
court was such as required of him a standard of care
which would preclude his involvement in a moving automobile accident at any intersection, regardless of the
24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

traffic control devices there employed and the observance
of the same by the other drivers, without calling in issue
his own contributory negligence. Such was the effect of
letting the jury consider the driver's honest but understandably erroneous statements, which were contrary to
the undisputed physical eidence, upon the issue of his
own negligence. The net result was the anomalous verdict of the jury which necessarily had to be based upon
unsubstantial evidence and against the great preponderance of the evidence contrary to law. In addition it
allowed the jury to speculate upon the evidence and to
resort to surmise, conjecture or guesswork in reaching
its verdict upon evidence which was clearly more consistent with the absence of Jon Larson's negligence than
with its existence.
The complete absence of any evidence of Jon Larson's lack of control over his vehicle at the time of the
accident, together with the absence of any evidence of
excess speed on the part of the Larson vehicle, particularly in view of the failure of the defendant to establish
any speed standards in the record, absolutely invalidated
the instruction and interrogatories of the trial court on
the issue of the plaintiff driver's contributory negligence.
Surely there could be no more classic example of allowing a jury to infer negligence from "any state of facts
whatever" than has been done in this case. The evidence
is complete. The negligence of the defendant is established
as a matter of law. The absence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff driver has been established as a matter of law. There remains only the
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determination to be made of the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs. This court should, therefore, set aside
the verdict and judgment of the lower court and remand
the ca.se to that court for a jury determination upon the
question of damages only after which a judgment should
be entered for plaintiffs in accordance therewith.
It must also he concluded, as a matter of law, that
the lower court erred in submitting to the jury Instruction No. 3 which incorporated a charge that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law with a totally unrelated instruction upon the open question of Jon Larson's contributory negligence. Such an instruction is
fraught with possibilities for confusion and incorrect
application of the law by the jury, and the court should
here determine that the giving of Instruction No. 3 was
reversible ·error.
Finally, it is absolutely clear that the giving of Instruction No. 8 had the effect of allowing the jury to
reconsider the negligence of acts which had already been
determined negligent as a matter of law by the court
and, because it is impossible to determine what effect
this had upon the deliberations of the jury, the judgment
of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DONN E. CASSITY,
JAMES L. BARKER, JR.
JACK L. CRELLIN,
Attorneys for Appellants
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